TGIF Randomosity!
6 hours ago
The long-feared capitulation of American consumers has arrived. According to Thursday’s G.D.P. report, real consumer spending fell at an annual rate of 3.1 percent in the third quarter; real spending on durable goods (stuff like cars and TVs) fell at an annual rate of 14 percent.
To appreciate the significance of these numbers, you need to know that American consumers almost never cut spending. Consumer demand kept rising right through the 2001 recession; the last time it fell even for a single quarter was in 1991, and there hasn’t been a decline this steep since 1980, when the economy was suffering from a severe recession combined with double-digit inflation.
Also, these numbers are from the third quarter — the months of July, August, and September. So these data are basically telling us what happened before confidence collapsed after the fall of Lehman Brothers in mid-September, not to mention before the Dow plunged below 10,000. Nor do the data show the full effects of the sharp cutback in the availability of consumer credit, which is still under way.
So this looks like the beginning of a very big change in consumer behavior. And it couldn’t have come at a worse time.
It’s true that American consumers have long been living beyond their means. In the mid-1980s Americans saved about 10 percent of their income. Lately, however, the savings rate has generally been below 2 percent — sometimes it has even been negative — and consumer debt has risen to 98 percent of G.D.P., twice its level a quarter-century ago.
Some economists told us not to worry because Americans were offsetting their growing debt with the ever-rising values of their homes and stock portfolios. Somehow, though, we’re not hearing that argument much lately.
Sooner or later, then, consumers were going to have to pull in their belts. But the timing of the new sobriety is deeply unfortunate. One is tempted to echo St. Augustine’s plea: “Grant me chastity and continence, but not yet.” For consumers are cutting back just as the U.S. economy has fallen into a liquidity trap — a situation in which the Federal Reserve has lost its grip on the economy.
Some background: one of the high points of the semester, if you’re a teacher of introductory macroeconomics, comes when you explain how individual virtue can be public vice, how attempts by consumers to do the right thing by saving more can leave everyone worse off. The point is that if consumers cut their spending, and nothing else takes the place of that spending, the economy will slide into a recession, reducing everyone’s income.
In fact, consumers’ income may actually fall more than their spending, so that their attempt to save more backfires — a possibility known as the paradox of thrift.
At this point, however, the instructor hastens to explain that virtue isn’t really vice: in practice, if consumers were to cut back, the Fed would respond by slashing interest rates, which would help the economy avoid recession and lead to a rise in investment. So virtue is virtue after all, unless for some reason the Fed can’t offset the fall in consumer spending.
I’ll bet you can guess what’s coming next.
For the fact is that we are in a liquidity trap right now: Fed policy has lost most of its traction. It’s true that Ben Bernanke hasn’t yet reduced interest rates all the way to zero, as the Japanese did in the 1990s. But it’s hard to believe that cutting the federal funds rate from 1 percent to nothing would have much positive effect on the economy. In particular, the financial crisis has made Fed policy largely irrelevant for much of the private sector: The Fed has been steadily cutting away, yet mortgage rates and the interest rates many businesses pay are higher than they were early this year.
The capitulation of the American consumer, then, is coming at a particularly bad time. But it’s no use whining. What we need is a policy response.
The ongoing efforts to bail out the financial system, even if they work, won’t do more than slightly mitigate the problem. Maybe some consumers will be able to keep their credit cards, but as we’ve seen, Americans were overextended even before banks started cutting them off.
No, what the economy needs now is something to take the place of retrenching consumers. That means a major fiscal stimulus. And this time the stimulus should take the form of actual government spending rather than rebate checks that consumers probably wouldn’t spend.
After Porsche declared it held sway, directly or indirectly, over more than 74 per cent of VW’s shares this week, fund managers have been struggling to buy back shares to cover their short positions, pushing the carmaker’s share price ever higher.
There is widespread speculation that the losses nursed by some hedge funds may be enough to force them under.
One hedge fund manager said: “Being long of VW preference shares and short of the ordinary shares was a very common trade and there may have been more than 100 managers doing it”.
Funds including Greenlight Capital, headed by David Einhorn, and Odey Asset Management have recently told clients that they had big short positions in VW.
Other managers, including Highbridge Capital Management, have sought to refute reports of big losses in VW.
Marshall Wace said its losses on VW trades “were immaterial”.
Citadel Investments, one of world’s biggest funds cited to have lost money on VW, said: “We have suffered no losses of substance on Volkswagen whatsoever.”
The losses have been exaggerated, argues Andrew Baker, deputy chief executive of the Alternative Investment Management Association.
He points out that the cost of selling VW short had become prohibitively expensive for many funds. What is more, the trade had become so “crowded” – that is, so many managers were doing the same thing – it would have warned managers of the high risks involved and “managers have become more risk averse”.
San Francisco — Sears (SHLD) is offering VenJuvo’s Trade4Credit program to Sears.com shoppers that allows consumers to earn Sears store credit in exchange for trading in pre-owned electronics that have been determined to still hold value.
The program, which offers free recycling and shipping, will accept a variety of electronics including iPhones, digital cameras and camcorders, MP3 players, GPS systems and gaming systems.
“At Sears we’re always looking for ways to help our customers maximize their spending dollars,” said Jonathan Magasanik, VP/general merchandise manager of home electronics for Sears Holdings. “The Trade4Credit program does just that by providing our customers with an easy way to transform their used electronics into store credit they can use to buy the Sears products they’ve really been wanting.”
To use the service, consumers simply have to log onto www.sears.trade4credit.com, select their item and enter the specifics about their device so the system can calculate an estimated trade-in value. Once the value is established, the user can print out the prepaid mailing label and send the device to VenJuvo. Once the device is received, VenJuvo will validate the value and within three days of that point the user will be able to collect a Sears gift card for that value.
The deal, which was to have been structured as a takeover of Goldman by Citigroup, would have led to the firing of thousands of workers in the investment banking units of the two companies, and the loss of several senior executives, the newspaper said
However, uniting Goldman’s strengths in risk management, advisory services and proprietary trading with Citi’s large retail deposit base and huge corporate client network could have created a powerful financial giant.
Industry insiders argue that such a deal could have also benefited the US financial system by creating a counterpoint to JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America, two institutions that have significantly expanded during the recent raft of government-induced rescue deals.
Now that Jerry Yang is planning to cut 10% of Yahoo's work force, he might want to contemplate saving a bit more money by firing some of his advisers.
[Yahoo's daily share price]
Not only did the Yahoo CEO end up turning down Microsoft's $33-a-share offer for his company, a price that now feels like a distant memory, but he paid through the nose for advice on doing so.
Yahoo disclosed late Tuesday in its third-quarter earnings release that it spent $37 million on advisory fees in the third quarter -- a million dollars more than it had spent on advice over the previous two quarters combined.
The amount was big enough to make a significant impact on Yahoo's operating income, which fell 53% to $70 million in the quarter. Without the fees, Yahoo's operating income would have been down only -- yes, only -- 28.6%.
Based on data as of June 30, 2008, which represent the latest adjusted deposit data available from all insured depository institutions, the total amount of deposits of insured depository institutions in the United States was approximately $7.195 trillion. The data indicate that, on June 30, 2008, Wells Fargo controlled deposits
of approximately $298.2 billion, and Wachovia controlled deposits of approximately
$429.6 billion.
As of that date, the combined firm would have controlled approximately 10.116 percent of the total amount of deposits of insured depository institutions in the
United States on consummation of the proposal. Wells Fargo and Wachovia provided data on their respective adjusted deposit totals as of September 30, 2008. These data indicate that, on a combined basis, Wells Fargo would control approximately $731.1 billion in deposits on consummation of the proposal.
Deposit amounts for other insured depository organizations are not available because institutions are not required to file Call Reports for the third quarter until the end of October, and such data will not be available for review until later in November.
The prohibition in the BHC Act, by its terms, applies if “upon consummation of the acquisition (emphasis added)” the applicant would control more than 10 percent of the total amount of deposits of insured depository institutions in the United States. While the June 30, 2008, deposit data are the most recent data currently available on a uniform basis, the Board believes that other evidence indicates
that the June 30, 2008, data do not reflect the current situation nor would those data accurately reflect the deposit ratio at the time required by the statute, which is the time of consummation of the acquisition.
Other data sources indicate, for example, that the total amount of deposits
in the United States has significantly increased since June 30, 2008. Deposit data
collected by the Federal Reserve in its survey of domestically chartered commercial
banks and reported on the Board’s H.8 Release (Assets and Liabilities of Commercial
Banks) for September 2008 indicate that total deposits of insured commercial banks in
the United States increased by approximately 3.9 percent during the third quarter of 2008.
Estimated nationwide deposit growth in excess of 3 percent is corroborated by other
deposit data sources. If total deposits reported on June 30, 2008, are adjusted to
account for this level of growth, the combined deposits of Wells Fargo and Wachovia
as of September 30, 2008, would be below 10 percent of nationwide deposits. Indeed,
Wells Fargo’s percentage of total nationwide deposits would be less than 10 percent if adjusted deposits for all insured depository institutions in the United States grew by at least 1.62 percent since June 30, 2008, which would result in a total amount of adjusted deposits all for insured depository institutions of at least $7.311 trillion.
Based on all the information available to the Board, the Board concluded that the combined organization would not control an amount of deposits that would exceed the nationwide deposit cap on consummation of the proposal. To ensure compliance with the deposit limits on acquisitions, Wells Fargo has committed that, on consummation, the combined organization would not exceed the nationwide deposit cap based on the data reported by all depository institutions as of September 30, 2008. This commitment includes a commitment that Wells Fargo will reduce its deposits by any amount that exceeds the nationwide deposit cap based on Call Report data as of September 30, 2008, by no later than December 31, 2008.
The Board has carefully considered the proposal under the financial factors. The proposed transaction is structured as a share exchange. The subsidiary depository institutions of Wells Fargo and Wachovia are well capitalized and would remain so on consummation of this proposal. Wells Fargo is well capitalized and has announced that it intends to raise additional capital. In light of its capital-raising efforts,
Wells Fargo would remain well capitalized after consummation of this proposal.
The Board has also considered the other financial factors noted above in light of information provided by Wells Fargo and Wachovia and supervisory information available to the Federal Reserve through its supervision of these companies and from the primary supervisors of the depository institution subsidiaries of these companies. Based on its review of the record, the Board finds that Wells Fargo has sufficient resources to effect the proposal.
In disclosing plans to buy a quarter-trillion dollars of bank stock in the name of the American taxpayer, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson harped on confidence. "Today, there is a lack of confidence in our financial system, a lack of confidence that must be conquered," he said on Tuesday.James Grant, the editor of Grant's Interest Rate Observer, is the author of the forthcoming "Mr. Market Miscalculates: The Bubble Years and Beyond."
What Mr. Paulson did not get around to mentioning was the excess of confidence that preceded the shortfall. Under the spell of soaring house prices (and before that, of stock prices), Americans trusted the things they ought to have doubted. But markets are cyclical, and there is always a new day. In compensating fashion, people will eventually doubt the things they ought to have trusted. Investment opportunity follows disillusionment. It's complacency that precedes bear markets.
If the confidence deficit seems so high, it's because the preceding confidence surplus was full to overflowing. People suspended critical judgment. They accepted at face value the pretensions of central bankers and the competence of investment bankers. Not one professional investor in 50, probably, doubted that wads of subprime mortgages could be refashioned into bonds that were just as creditworthy as U.S. Treasurys.
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke and his predecessor, Alan Greenspan, were fine ones for believing impossible things. They propounded them, too. Never mind asset bubbles, they said. Not only can't you predict them, but you can't even recognize them after they've swollen to grotesque maturity. Better just to tidy up after they burst. Now Mr. Bernanke is likening our present troubles to those of the 1930s. The comparison is more confidence-sapping than he seems to realize. From peak to trough, 1929 to 1933, the gross domestic product was almost sawed in half, before adjusting for changes in the purchasing power of the dollar. No such mitigating fact helps to explain today's set-to. It's a crisis of competence of our financiers, of bankers and central bankers alike.
To the self-satisfied elders of the Fed, the past 25 years were a sweet validation of the art of central banking and of the efficacy of paper money. "The Great Moderation," some of them called this interlude of low inflation and subdued economic activity -- neither too boomy on the up side nor too recessionary on the down side. For these manifold blessings, the officials thanked, in good part, themselves, i.e., "the credibility of monetary policy," as the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Janet Yellen, put it earlier this year.
But it wasn't the vigilance of monetary policy that facilitated the construction of the tree house of leverage that is falling down on our heads today. On the contrary: Artificially low interest rates, imposed by the Federal Reserve itself, were one cause of the trouble. America's privileged place in the monetary world was -- oddly enough -- another. No gold standard checked the emission of new dollar bills during the quarter-century on which the central bankers so pride themselves. And partly because there was no external check on monetary expansion, debt grew much faster than the income with which to service it. Since 1983, debt has expanded by 8.9% a year, GDP by 5.9%. The disparity in growth rates may not look like much, but it generated a powerful result over time. Over the 25 years, total debt -- private and public, financial and non-financial -- has risen by $45.1 trillion, GDP by only $10.9 trillion. You can almost infer the size of the gulf by the lopsided prosperity of the purveyors of debt. In 1983, banks, brokerage houses and other financial businesses contributed 15.8% to domestic corporate profits. It's double that today.
Related
Attaching a face to an issue, as the presidential candidates did in the latest debate, has a history of success and plenty of backfires. Read Forbears of 'Joe the Plumber.'
The modern financial economy requires a certain minimum leap of faith. The paper dollar is an example. There is nothing behind it except the government's good intentions, yet we hoard it as if it were gold. However, we collectively outdid ourselves in credulousness in the runup to the financial crisis. People believed the Fed's good press, as, evidently, the Fed did itself. Then there was the ever-flattering dollar. Warts and all, the American scrip is the world's top monetary brand. It is this country's leading export -- and the agent of not a little of today's financial dislocations. It is the dollar -- the world's reserve currency -- that has allowed this country to consume much more than it produces and to put the deficit on a mammoth annual running tab, about $700 billion in even this year of a much improved trade picture.
Over the past few months, the dollar has found favor as a safe haven. But it was a drug on the market for years before. Asian central banks would buy up greenbacks by the boxcarful. Few profit-seeking entities seemed to want them. The central banks did not obtain their dollars for free, of course. They bought them from local exporters, paying with the local currencies that the bankers themselves printed. Since the close of 2002, developing-country central banks have absorbed more than $2 trillion in this fashion. This is debt that, under a gold-based monetary system, the United States could probably not have incurred. Living so grandly beyond our means, we would have raised the suspicions of our creditors, who would not unreasonably have begun to exchange their paper dollars for the gold that stood behind them. The loss of gold would have cut short our high living.
Our foreign creditors accepted dollars in payment for their goods and services -- and then obligingly invested the same dollars in America's own securities. It's as if the money never left the 50 states. If Americans seemed an unusually complacent lot before the roof fell in, it was no wonder. Owning the reserve currency franchise, any other people would have been just as fat and just as happy.
So, brimful of confidence, we ran down our savings and ran up our debts. Among the myriad varieties of 21st-century debts we incurred were mortgage contraptions so complex as to baffle even the people who invented them. Yet professional investors snapped them up at interest rates only a few tenths of a percentage point higher than Treasury-bill yields. It bolstered the investors' confidence that the structures -- residential mortgage-backed securities and variations on the same -- were appraised triple-A.
When unfounded confidence was still supporting excessive leverage, private equity promoters bought up whole companies. They borrowed most of the purchase price at negligible interest cost and with few of the legal safeguards customarily afforded to senior creditors. The confidence of the creditors was even more ill-founded than that of the promoters -- and far less explicable, because there was so much less potential profit in it for the lenders than for the equity investors. When the music finally stopped, some investors were still in mid-deal. Cerberus Capital Management had not yet consummated its proposed purchase of United Rentals, for instance. Neither had General Electric Capital Corp. and Blackstone Group bought PHH, nor Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and Goldman Sachs Capital Partners acquired Harman. Next thing you knew, the transactions were being canceled.
The would-be acquirers prided themselves on the thoroughness of their due diligence and on the conservatism of their financial forecasts. Each announced an acquisition price that, supposedly, gave full value to the selling shareholders while still affording the prospect of a not-so-distant payday for the leveraged acquirer. But, without willing lenders or a rising stock market, the buyers withdrew.
The share prices of the target companies thereupon pulled back. One had expected it. But the former takeover candidates' prices have plunged by 70% or more. Reddy Ice, the No. 1 manufacturer and distributor of packaged ice, is cheaper by 92% than it was on the day last summer when its falsely confident suitor, GSO Capital Partners, bid to take it private at 50 times earnings. Interestingly, no new buyer has appeared now that the shares are quoted at less than seven times earnings. Confidence in the judgment of our private equity titans is belatedly being marked to market.
Such is the way of markets -- and of the fallible investors who operate in them. High prices boost our confidence, low prices sap it. We seek out bargains in Wal-Mart, but run away from them on the New York Stock Exchange. The proliferation of investment bargains brings us no joy. Share-price volatility is testing all-time highs. The debt markets are inconsolable. The triple-A rated mortgage bonds that once yielded only a small increment over the basic wholesale money-market interest rate today fetch 12% and up. And those are the securities that, as Grant's Interest Rate Observer does the numbers, appear to be money-good -- barring another 20% or 25% decline in house prices. Yet if the risk of true apocalypse in real estate is great enough to warrant these towering mortgage yields, there can be no easy explanation of the relatively low yields still attached to the unsecured debentures of some big American retailers. Lowe's Cos., the giant home-improvement chain, would surely feel it if house prices dropped -- again -- through the floor. But an issue of unsecured Lowe's debentures, the 5s of October 2015, are quoted at a price to yield just 5.8%.
In investment markets, confidence and coherence tend to restore themselves. The hardy souls who lead the way back derive their confidence not from the Treasury Secretary but from the pages of "Security Analysis," by Benjamin Graham and David L. Dodd, the value investor's bible.
But these are frightening times, and there is no very large constituency favoring the natural restorative processes of free markets. "A new form of capitalism is needed, based on values which put finance at the service of business and citizens, not vice versa." Nicolas Sarkozy, the president of France, recently said that, but the sentiment is on the lips of heads of state the world over.
In the past two weeks, governments in Asia, Europe and the U.S. have effectively nationalized vast swaths of banking. Central banks have ramped up their money printing. In the past week alone, the Fed's balance sheet swelled by $179 billion, to a grand total of $1.77 trillion. In announcing such radical measures, intervening governments never fail to invoke confidence. They say they must restore it.
Destroying confidence, however, is what governments do best. And the confidence they can restore is usually the kind that got us where we are today. Inflation and moral hazard led directly to the immense overvaluation of equities and residential real estate -- and of the bloating of the leverage that sustained those prices. Yet, to cure what ails us, credit creation and the public guarantee of banking liabilities are the policies today most favored.
Perhaps the world has gone so far down the path of socialized finance that there's no turning back. However, the doughty remnant of capitalists should be under no illusion about the risks and opportunities they confront. They can't miss the risks. Mr. Paulson pledges that the government's bank investments will be passive and apolitical, but the record of the Depression-era Reconstruction Finance Corp. suggests that the federal government is a shareholder that can throw its weight around. Besides, would Mr. Paulson's apolitical intentions bind his successor?
For the false confidence that played so important a part in the creation of the late excesses, the government should decently bear its share of blame. It accepts none of it, however, at least none that Messrs. Paulson or Bernanke have admitted to. Not that a federal confession of sin would expunge the financial errors of the debt-financed upswing. But it would, at least, clear the intellectual air and help the country and its creditors find a way to do better next time. For a start, the Fed might foreswear the Greenspan-inspired conceit that it can put the economy back together again after a debt bomb explodes.
And the opportunities? For the first time in a long time, stocks, tradable bank loans and mortgages are becoming cheap. The bear market is truly a value restoration project. Wall Street will be going on sale -- if the government will let it. For the entrepreneur, the silver lining in the federalization of finance is obvious. Start a bank or broker-dealer to compete with the institutions that will soon be smothered in Mr. Paulson's quarter-trillion dollar embrace. There's oxygen, still, in the free market.
Circuit City Stores Inc. is considering a plan to close at least 150 stores and cut thousands of jobs, as an alternative to filing for bankruptcy-court protection, said people familiar with the company.
Earlier this month, the nation's No. 2 electronics retailer by sales hired Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP -- the law firm that oversaw the Chapter 11 reorganization of Kmart -- as its bankruptcy counsel, according to several people familiar with the matter.
Circuit City also retained FTI Consulting Inc. to develop a turnaround plan and investment bank Rothschild Inc. to guide talks with banks and secure emergency financing, these people said.
Today I write not to gloat. Given the pain that nearly everyone is experiencing, that would be entirely inappropriate. Nor am I writing to make further predictions, as most of my forecasts in previous letters have unfolded or are in the process of unfolding. Instead, I am writing to say goodbye.
Recently, on the front page of Section C of the Wall Street Journal, a hedge fund manager who was also closing up shop (a $300 million fund), was quoted as saying, "What I have learned about the hedge fund business is that I hate it." I could not agree more with that statement. I was in this game for the money. The low hanging fruit, i.e. idiots whose parents paid for prep school, Yale, and then the Harvard MBA, was there for the taking. These people who were (often) truly not worthy of the education they received (or supposedly received) rose to the top of companies such as AIG, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers and all levels of our government. All of this behavior supporting the Aristocracy, only ended up making it easier for me to find people stupid enough to take the other side of my trades. God bless America.
There are far too many people for me to sincerely thank for my success. However, I do not want to sound like a Hollywood actor accepting an award. The money was reward enough. Furthermore, the endless list those deserving thanks know who they are.
I will no longer manage money for other people or institutions. I have enough of my own wealth to manage. Some people, who think they have arrived at a reasonable estimate of my net worth, might be surprised that I would call it quits with such a small war chest. That is fine; I am content with my rewards. Moreover, I will let others try to amass nine, ten or eleven figure net worths. Meanwhile, their lives suck. Appointments back to back, booked solid for the next three months, they look forward to their two week vacation in January during which they will likely be glued to their Blackberries or other such devices. What is the point? They will all be forgotten in fifty years anyway. Steve Balmer, Steven Cohen, and Larry Ellison will all be forgotten. I do not understand the legacy thing. Nearly everyone will be forgotten. Give up on leaving your mark. Throw the Blackberry away and enjoy life.
So this is it. With all due respect, I am dropping out. Please do not expect any type of reply to emails or voicemails within normal time frames or at all. Andy Springer and his company will be handling the dissolution of the fund. And don't worry about my employees, they were always employed by Mr. Springer's company and only one (who has been well-rewarded) will lose his job.
I have no interest in any deals in which anyone would like me to participate. I truly do not have a strong opinion about any market right now, other than to say that things will continue to get worse for some time, probably years. I am content sitting on the sidelines and waiting. After all, sitting and waiting is how we made money from the subprime debacle. I now have time to repair my health, which was destroyed by the stress I layered onto myself over the past two years, as well as my entire life -- where I had to compete for spaces in universities and graduate schools, jobs and assets under management -- with those who had all the advantages (rich parents) that I did not. May meritocracy be part of a new form of government, which needs to be established.
On the issue of the U.S. Government, I would like to make a modest proposal. First, I point out the obvious flaws, whereby legislation was repeatedly brought forth to Congress over the past eight years, which would have reigned in the predatory lending practices of now mostly defunct institutions. These institutions regularly filled the coffers of both parties in return for voting down all of this legislation designed to protect the common citizen. This is an outrage, yet no one seems to know or care about it. Since Thomas Jefferson and Adam Smith passed, I would argue that there has been a dearth of worthy philosophers in this country, at least ones focused on improving government. Capitalism worked for two hundred years, but times change, and systems become corrupt. George Soros, a man of staggering wealth, has stated that he would like to be remembered as a philosopher. My suggestion is that this great man start and sponsor a forum for great minds to come together to create a new system of government that truly represents the common man's interest, while at the same time creating rewards great enough to attract the best and brightest minds to serve in government roles without having to rely on corruption to further their interests or lifestyles. This forum could be similar to the one used to create the operating system, Linux, which competes with Microsoft's near monopoly. I believe there is an answer, but for now the system is clearly broken.
Lastly, while I still have an audience, I would like to bring attention to an alternative food and energy source. You won't see it included in BP's, "Feel good. We are working on sustainable solutions," television commercials, nor is it mentioned in ADM's similar commercials. But hemp has been used for at least 5,000 years for cloth and food, as well as just about everything that is produced from petroleum products. Hemp is not marijuana and vice versa. Hemp is the male plant and it grows like a weed, hence the slang term. The original American flag was made of hemp fiber and our Constitution was printed on paper made of hemp. It was used as recently as World War II by the U.S. Government, and then promptly made illegal after the war was won. At a time when rhetoric is flying about becoming more self-sufficient in terms of energy, why is it illegal to grow this plant in this country? Ah, the female. The evil female plant -- marijuana. It gets you high, it makes you laugh, it does not produce a hangover. Unlike alcohol, it does not result in bar fights or wife beating. So, why is this innocuous plant illegal? Is it a gateway drug? No, that would be alcohol, which is so heavily advertised in this country. My only conclusion as to why it is illegal, is that Corporate America, which owns Congress, would rather sell you Paxil, Zoloft, Xanax and other additive drugs, than allow you to grow a plant in your home without some of the profits going into their coffers. This policy is ludicrous. It has surely contributed to our dependency on foreign energy sources. Our policies have other countries literally laughing at our stupidity, most notably Canada, as well as several European nations (both Eastern and Western). You would not know this by paying attention to U.S. media sources though, as they tend not to elaborate on who is laughing at the United States this week. Please people, let's stop the rhetoric and start thinking about how we can truly become self-sufficient.
With that I say good-bye and good luck.
All the best,
Andrew Lahde
National City Bank (NCC) CEO Peter Raskind said Wednesday that it’s “simply too soon to say” if the bank will avail itself of government assistance — and if it did, what the impact of that help would be.
“We’re closely studying the potential implications, you bet we are,” Mr. Raskind said. “We’re deeply engaged in that process, that analysis. We’re going to take a little more time than that.”
Mr. Raskind spoke to a crowd of nearly 200 people at a weekly lunch for chartered financial analysts sponsored by the CFA Society of Cleveland. Organizers said the meetings usually attract about 70 people and that Mr. Raskind’s talk was the best-attended event the group has held.
In his speech, Mr. Raskind also addressed rumors that the bank will be sold by saying that while he would not comment about speculation, he is “quite optimistic” about the future of the company.
National City has been steadily reducing its exposure to products sold through brokers and Mr. Raskind said “significant changes” to the bank’s businesses and leadership teams give him reason to be confident.
Still, he said, National City’s board of trustees understands its responsibility to shareholders and would seriously consider selling the bank if that was in shareholders’ best interest. The board considered selling National City in March but decided that the capital infusion was the better choice. Mr. Raskind said that decision has turned out “quite clearly” to be the case.
So why isn't the San Francisco-based lender doing more to beef up its cushion against loan losses as the country slips into a recession?
As investors sift through banks' third-quarter numbers, they will be focusing on the strength of their loan-loss reserves, which exist to absorb losses from defaulted loans. Wells allowed a key measure of reserve strength to drop considerably.
If it had held that measure at its second-quarter level, Wells's third-quarter earnings would have been half the 49 cents per share it reported Wednesday. At a time when bad loans are expected to continue rising, it makes sense to compare a bank's loan-loss reserve with past-due loans.
Many of those won't return to health and will lead to a loss.
In the third quarter, Wells's $7.87 billion reserve was 1.57 times as big as its $5 billion in past-due loans. That's down from 1.81 times in the second quarter. Maintaining that ratio at 1.81 times in the third quarter would have taken an extra $1.18 billion out of earnings.
After tax, that would work out to 24 cents a share.
Wells's defenders might argue that some loan portfolios are not deteriorating as fast as they had been, allowing the bank to ease up a bit on this reserve measure. But that's a bold step in a faltering economy.
Even after getting $25 billion under the government's financial-rescue plan, Wells still wants to raise another $20 billion of capital on its own to support its planned purchase of Wachovia (WB).
Milwaukee, Wis., October 16, 2008 — Harley-Davidson, Inc. (NYSE: HOG) today announced its results for the third quarter ended September 28, 2008. Revenue for the quarter was $1.42 billion compared to $1.54 billion in the year ago quarter, a 7.7 percent decrease. Net income for the quarter was $166.5 million compared to $265.0 million in the third quarter 2007, a decrease of 37.1 percent. Third quarter diluted earnings per share were $0.71, a 33.6 percent decrease compared to last year’s $1.07.
“In the U.S., dealer retail sales of new Harley-Davidson motorcycles in the quarter were in line with our expectations,” said Jim Ziemer, Chief Executive Officer of Harley-Davidson, Inc. “Although Harley-Davidson retail motorcycle sales in international markets overall continued to grow double digits in the quarter, unit sales in several European countries slowed more than we anticipated during September as a result of deteriorating economic conditions. We continue to carefully monitor all markets in light of the potential impact of the current economic realities.”
For the full year 2008, the Company has narrowed its shipment expectations to 303,500 to 306,000 Harley-Davidson motorcycles. The Company has narrowed its expectations for diluted earnings per share for the full year to $3.00 to $3.10 from the prior range of $3.00 to $3.18.
“We also have been able to maintain Harley-Davidson Financial Services’ position as a stable, consistent source of financing for dealers and retail customers during these turbulent conditions in the credit markets,” Ziemer said. “Prudent management and customer access to credit will continue to be priorities at HDFS.”
“During the third quarter, we completed our acquisition of Italian motorcycle maker MV Agusta Group, expanding our opportunities in Europe. Our 105th Anniversary Celebration at the end of August drew tremendous, highly enthusiastic crowds. And we opened the Harley-Davidson MuseumTM, with its broad appeal to riders and non-riders alike. So even in the midst of economic uncertainty, we continue to broaden our appeal, plant seeds for the future and give people unparalleled experiences and reasons to ride,” Ziemer said.
“Going forward, we expect the global economy and consumer concerns to continue to create challenges for Harley-Davidson through the end of the year and in 2009. I remain confident about our future as we continue to manage and reinvest in the business,” said Ziemer.
Motorcycles and Related Products Segment – Third Quarter Results
Revenue from Harley-Davidson motorcycles was $1.05 billion, a decrease of $131.7 million or 11.1 percent versus the same period last year. Shipments of Harley-Davidson motorcycles totaled 74,704 units, a decrease of 11,831 units or 13.7 percent compared to last year’s third quarter.
Revenue from Parts and Accessories (P&A), which consists of Genuine Motor Parts and Genuine Motor Accessories, totaled $259.0 million, an increase of $7.5 million or 3.0 percent over the year-ago quarter. Revenue from General Merchandise, which consists of MotorClothes® apparel and collectibles, totaled $84.0 million, an increase of $0.8 million or 1.0 percent over the year-ago quarter.
Gross margin for the third quarter of 2008 was 34.0 percent of revenue compared to 38.4 percent for the third quarter last year. This decrease is primarily due to higher product costs and the allocation of fixed costs over fewer units than last year’s third quarter. Third quarter operating margin decreased to 16.4 percent from 23.2 percent in the third quarter of 2007. Operating margin for the third quarter of 2008 includes the impact of a one-time $16.6 million expense related to the value of acquired in-process research and development at MV Agusta Group.
Motorcycle Retail Sales Data
During the third quarter, worldwide retail sales of Harley-Davidson motorcycles decreased 9.6 percent compared to the third quarter of 2007. U.S. retail sales of Harley-Davidson motorcycles decreased 15.5 percent for the quarter. The heavyweight motorcycle market in the U.S. decreased 3.1 percent for the same period.
Retail sales of Harley-Davidson motorcycles grew 11.3 percent in the Company’s international markets during the third quarter of 2008 compared to the third quarter of 2007. Third quarter retail sales increased 12.4 percent in Canada; the Europe Region was up 2.9 percent; the Asia Pacific Region was up 17.5 percent; and the Latin America Region was up 41.6 percent.
During the first nine months of 2008, worldwide retail sales of Harley-Davidson motorcycles decreased 6.0 percent compared to the prior year. In the U.S., Harley-Davidson motorcycle retail sales decreased 11.9 percent for the first nine months of the year while the U.S. heavyweight market was down 4.0 percent for the same period. International retail sales increased by 12.6 percent for the first nine months of 2008.
Third quarter and year-to-date data are listed in the accompanying tables.
MV Agusta
On August 8, 2008, the Company completed the purchase of the privately-held Italian motorcycle maker MV Agusta Group. The Company acquired 100 percent of MV Agusta Group shares for total consideration of 68.3 million euros ($105.1 million), which includes the satisfaction of existing bank debt for 47.5 million euros ($73.2 million). As a result of the acquisition, the Company recorded $87.9 million of goodwill and the $16.6 million one-time expense related to the value of acquired in-process research and development. These results are included in the quarterly financial data.
Financial Services Segment
Harley-Davidson Financial Services (HDFS) operating income for the third quarter was $35.6 million, a decrease of $13.9 million or 28.0 percent compared to the year-ago quarter. The decrease is primarily due to a $9.4 million write-down of finance receivables held for sale to fair value. In addition, last year’s third quarter included a $3.5 million securitization gain compared to no securitization transaction during the third quarter of 2008.
Income Tax Rate
The Company’s third quarter effective income tax rate was 38.2 percent compared to 35.5 percent in the same quarter last year. The third quarter increase was due primarily to a non-deductible in-process research and development charge for MV Agusta Group and the expiration of the federal research and development tax credit as of December 31, 2007. In October 2008, the federal research and development tax credit was reinstated for two years retroactive to January 1, 2008 continuing through December 31, 2009. The Company expects its full year effective income tax rate in 2008 will be approximately 35.5 percent.
Harley-Davidson, Inc. — Nine Month Results
For the first nine months of 2008, revenue totaled $4.30 billion, a 0.9 percent decrease from the year-ago period. Diluted earnings per share were $2.45, a decrease of 16.9 percent compared to the same period last year.
Through the first nine months of this year, shipments of Harley-Davidson motorcycles were 226,898 units, a 9.0 percent decrease compared to last year’s 249,413 units. Harley-Davidson motorcycle revenue was $3.26 billion, which is down 2.2 percent compared to last year’s $3.33 billion. P&A revenue totaled $706.6 million, a 0.5 percent increase over last year’s $703.1 million. General Merchandise revenue totaled $244.8 million, a 5.5 percent increase compared to $232.0 million during the same period in 2007.
HDFS operating income was $107.7 million, a 38.0 percent decrease from last year’s $173.6 million.
Cash Flow
Cash and marketable securities totaled $504.9 million as of September 28, 2008. Cash used by operations was $221.2 million, and capital expenditures were $153.7 million during the first nine months of 2008. For the full year of 2008, capital expenditures are still expected to be between $235 million and $250 million.
Stock Repurchase
The Company repurchased 2.5 million shares of its common stock at a cost of $100.1 million during the third quarter of 2008. On September 28, 2008, the Company had 232.8 million shares of common stock outstanding.
As of September 28, 2008, there were 16.7 million shares remaining on a board-approved share repurchase authorization. An additional board-approved share repurchase authorization is in place to offset option exercises.

During the discussion, the most animated response came from Wells Fargo (WFC) Chairman Richard Kovacevich, say people present. Why was this necessary? he asked. Why did the government need to buy stakes in these banks?It continues:
Morgan Stanley (MS) Chief Executive John Mack, whose company was among the most vulnerable in the group to the swirling financial crisis, quickly signed.
Bank of America's (BAC) Kenneth Lewis acknowledged the obvious, that everyone at the table would participate. "Any one of us who doesn't have a healthy fear of the unknown isn't paying attention," he said.
Mr. Paulson said the public had lost confidence in the banking system. "The system needs more money, and all of you will be better off if there's more capital in the system," Mr. Paulson told the bankers.
After Mr. Kovacevich voiced his concerns, Mr. Paulson described the deal starkly. He told the Wells Fargo chairman he could accept the government's money or risk going without the infusion. If the company found it needed capital later and Mr. Kovacevich couldn't raise money privately, Mr. Paulson promised the government wouldn't be so generous the second time around.