Fairfax Financials (FFH) Watsa has gotten quite a bit of press lately. Here he is giving a talk at the Ben Graham Center for Value Investing.
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The filing to the Securities and Exchange Commission sheds light on how much of a threat new competition is to Starbucks, as McDonald's Corp. and other restaurants add espresso drinks and more elaborate beverages. In the filing, Starbucks says that, in the U.S., "the continued focus by one or more large competitors in the quick-service restaurant sector on selling high-quality specialty coffee beverages at a low cost has attracted Starbucks customers and could, if the numbers become large enough, adversely affect the company's sales and results of operations."
A short quiz: If you plan to eat hamburgers throughout your life and are not a cattle producer, should you wish for higher or lower prices for beef? Likewise, if you are going to buy a car from time to time but are not an auto manufacturer, should you prefer higher or lower car prices? These questions, of course, answer themselves.
But now for the final exam: If you expect to be a net saver during the next five years, should you hope for a higher or lower stock market during that period? Many investors get this one wrong. Even though they are going to be net buyers of stocks for many years to come, they are elated when stock prices rise and depressed when they fall. In effect, they rejoice because prices have risen for the "hamburgers" they will soon be buying. This reaction makes no sense. Only those who will be sellers of equities in the near future should be happy at seeing stocks rise. Prospective purchasers should much prefer sinking prices.
For shareholders of Berkshire who do not expect to sell, the choice is even clearer. To begin with, our owners are automatically saving even if they spend every dime they personally earn: Berkshire "saves" for them by retaining all earnings, thereafter using these savings to purchase businesses and securities. Clearly, the more cheaply we make these buys, the more profitable our owners' indirect savings program will be.
Furthermore, through Berkshire you own major positions in companies that consistently repurchase their shares. The benefits that these programs supply us grow as prices fall: When stock prices are low, the funds that an investee spends on repurchases increase our ownership of that company by a greater amount than is the case when prices are higher. For example, the repurchases that Coca-Cola, The Washington Post and Wells Fargo made in past years at very low prices benefitted Berkshire far more than do today's repurchases, made at loftier prices.
At the end of every year, about 97% of Berkshire's shares are held by the same investors who owned them at the start of the year. That makes them savers. They should therefore rejoice when markets decline and allow both us and our investees to deploy funds more advantageously.
So smile when you read a headline that says "Investors lose as market falls." Edit it in your mind to "Disinvestors lose as market falls -- but investors gain." Though writers often forget this truism, there is a buyer for every seller and what hurts one necessarily helps the other. (As they say in golf matches: "Every putt makes someone happy.")
We gained enormously from the low prices placed on many equities and businesses in the 1970s and 1980s. Markets that then were hostile to investment transients were friendly to those taking up permanent residence. In recent years, the actions we took in those decades have been validated, but we have found few new opportunities. In its role as a corporate "saver," Berkshire continually looks for ways to sensibly deploy capital, but it may be some time before we find opportunities that get us truly excited.
In the forecast prepared for the meeting, the staff lowered its projection for economic activity in the second half of 2008 as well as in 2009 and 2010. Real GDP appeared to have declined in the third quarter, and the few available indicators that reflected conditions following the intensification of the financial market turmoil in mid-September pointed to another decline in the fourth quarter. The declines in stock-market wealth, low levels of consumer sentiment, weakened household balance sheets, and restrictive credit conditions were likely to hinder household spending over the near term. Business expenditures also probably would be held back by a weaker sales outlook and tighter credit conditions. The staff expected that real GDP would continue to contract somewhat in the first half of 2009 and then rise in the second half, with the result that real GDP would be about unchanged for the year. Although futures markets pointed to a lower trajectory for oil prices than at the time of the September meeting, real activity was expected to be restrained by further contraction in residential investment, reduced household wealth, continued tight credit conditions, and a deterioration of foreign economic performance. In 2010, real GDP growth was expected to pick up to near the rate of potential growth, as the restraints on household and business spending from the financial market tensions were anticipated to begin to ease and the contraction in the housing market to come to an end. With growth below its potential rate for an extended period, the unemployment rate was expected to rise significantly through early 2010. The staff reduced its forecast for both core and overall PCE inflation, as the disinflationary effects of the receding cost pressures of energy, materials, and import prices and of resource slack were expected to be greater than at the time of the September FOMC meeting. Core inflation was projected to slow considerably in 2009 and then to edge down further in 2010.
Today we turn our attention to commodities, which have been badly battered by the global financial crisis, deleveraging and a worsening economic outlook, with commodity indices having lost 50% of their value since the July peak. With the G10 in recession and many emerging economies slowing sharply, further demand destruction is likely, and it may continue to outpace production cuts. Once the price adjustment filters through to producers, they may account for another source of slower aggregate output.
Despite the steep price declines so far, commodities as a group have only fallen halfway to their 2001-02 trough, meaning they may have farther to fall. Among individual commodities, those that grew the most expensive in the shortest period of time have suffered the sharpest and fastest price drops. In fact, some investors are pricing in a temporary drop in the price of oil below $30 per barrel, far below marginal production costs.
Metals and energy led recent declines, after breaching nominal and inflation-adjusted highs earlier this year. Agricultural commodities took smaller hits as their price climbs were not as excessive – their peak prices this year remained 2-3x below their inflation-adjusted highs in the 1970s. Only newsprint has yielded positive returns this year as of November but its resilience seems unsustainable in the medium-term. Across the commodities group, inventory buildup and falling demand creates conditions ripe for a continuing current bear market despite the fact that some commodities, such as oil, seem to have fallen below production costs.
WTI crude oil futures have fallen from a peak of $147/barrel in mid July to around $55/barrel, well below the 2007 average price. U.S. government data suggest that demand for oil products is about 6-7% lower than last year, with the sharpest declines in jet fuel. Despite the fact that gas prices are now hovering at $2 a gallon and energy costs fell 18% nationwide in October, demand continues to fall. Forecasts from the EIA and OPEC suggest that 2009 might mark make the largest contraction in oil demand in decades, despite the recent price correction. EM oil demand will be insufficient to offset growing declines in the OECD countries. For now, financial market trends and macro fundamentals might point in the same direction, towards weaker energy prices.
Yet, output cuts are reducing supply, removing the surplus reached earlier this year, even as OPEC’s surplus capacity increases. Non-OPEC supplies continue to disappoint. Oil production has declined in Russia, the North Sea and Mexico while new production in Kazakhstan and Brazil has yet to come on stream. In the short-term, it might take a major supply shock - say one that cuts off Iran’s oil supply or major output from the GCC - to really boost prices. The Somali pirate hijacking of a Saudi tanker might raise transport costs as insurance premiums rise and routings increase, and reminds observers of the energy supply chain’s vulnerabilities, but it may not have a major affect on oil market fundamentals. OPEC’s willingness to comply with current (and future?) production cuts may be the most significant supply side factor. Yet the elevated cost of new oil supplies may lead to future supply crunches. Canada’s oil sands are woefully expensive at today’s prices and projects are being deferred if not canceled.
Lower global energy demand, in the face of increasing supply, is also affecting current and expected natural gas prices. EIA has noted that the Henry Hub natural gas spot price projection for 2009 has fallen from $8.17 per Mcf to $6.82. The front month contract price of natural gas on NYMEX has steadily declined and the futures curve has sloped downward. Demand for alternative energy tends to move inversely to fossil fuel prices, so the deep cuts in oil and coal prices could pose a headwind for alternative energy, unless counteracted by climate change mandates. Fortunately for producers, falling grain prices will help relieve the profit margin squeeze, even if the credit crunch impairs borrowing for expansion.
There is now world-wide worrying about price deflation again. After all, real estate prices have sunk, stock prices have hit the ditch, the price of oil has the sheiks concerned, and even Las Vegas hotel room rates have plunged. Sounds like all good news for those of us who buy things, at the same time being a bit of a bummer for heavily indebted sellers.
But Ex-Federal Reserve governor Rick Mishkin told an early morning CNBC audience that "inflation could be too low." On the same program, James K. Galbraith, who teaches economics at the Lyndon Baines Johnson School at the University of Texas at Austin, chimed in that there has been "a huge deflationary shock" to the economy, and of course the government needs to step in and stabilize the markets and bail out businesses.
"The Fed did not allow the money base to expand, and we had a panic in the liquid markets," supply-side guru Arthur Laffer told a Las Vegas audience last week, "which caused this financial panic, pure and simple."
Across the pond, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, writing for the Telegraph, warns "Abandon all hope once you enter deflation." Fine wines and white truffles have dropped in price and these price drops could "spread through the broader economy, lodging like a virus in the British and global monetary systems."
"The curse of deflation is that it increases the burden of debts," frets Evans-Pritchard, who goes on to contend: "Deflation has other insidious traits. It causes shoppers to hold back. They wait for lower prices. Once this psychology gains a grip, it can gradually set off a self-feeding spiral that is hard to stop."
Yes, the current economics brain trust is worried that consumers will collectively show the good sense to delay purchases, pay down debt and increase their savings. After all, this liquidation of malinvestments will likely take awhile. The prudent thing to do in times of uncertainty is not to ramp up debt and spend money you don’t have.
But now all of a sudden saving is a dirty word. According to Evans-Pritchard, "It [savings] also redistributes wealth – the wrong way. Savings appreciate, which is nice for the ‘rentiers’ with capital. The effect is a large transfer of income from working people with mortgages to bondholders."
Of course sounder thinking economists don’t see deflation as evil, as Jörg Guido Hülsmann points out in his just published Deflation & Liberty, "it fulfills the very important social function of cleansing the economy and the body politic from all sorts of parasites that have thrived on the previous inflation."
And although Hülsmann’s definition of deflation is the proper one: a reduction in the quantity of base money, while what the main-stream blathers on about is a drop in prices, the point remains: "There is absolutely no reason to be concerned about the economic effects of deflation – unless one equates the welfare of the nation with the welfare of its false elites," explains Hülsmann.
But to say governments and their friends are concerned about deflation is an understatement. Professor Peter Spencer from York University says the Bank of England has learned many hard lessons since its founding in 1694. And with no gold standard to get in the way, that central bank is "cutting rates very fast, and if necessary they too will to turn to the helicopters," referring to Milton Friedman’s (or Ben Bernanke’s) idea that governments are capable of dropping bundles of banknotes from helicopters to stop deflation.
This printing of money "will keep the [deflation] wolf from the door," according to Professor Spencer. But creating more money doesn’t create more goods and services. There is no wolf at society’s door. "From the standpoint of the commonly shared interests of all members of society, the quantity of money is irrelevant," Hülsmann makes clear. And if the over indebted and the over lent go bankrupt, that’s fine. The fact is, these liquidations have no effect on the real wealth of a nation, and as Hülsmann stresses, "they do not prevent the successful continuation of production."
Meanwhile the Bernanke Fed has gone on an unprecedented growth spurt, more than doubling its balance sheet – out of thin air – in an attempt to bail out the financial community. Formerly the asset side of the American central bank’s balance sheet was Treasury securities with a dash of gold. Now the Fed, despite being double the size, has fewer Treasury securities, with the rest being the toxic securities that has buckled the big Wall Street banks. It’s as if Bernanke is channeling John Law, the architect of France’s Mississippi Bubble back in 1720. Law couldn’t keep his bubble inflated and neither will Bernanke and his fellow central bankers.
While central bankers furiously try to re-inflate, cheered on by the mainstream financial media, monetary authorities should deflate the money supply, pulling in their horns like consumers are doing. Deflation is a "great liberating force," writes Hülsmann, "because it destroys the economic basis of the social engineers, spin doctors, and brain washers."
John Paulson, the hedge fund manager who was called before Congress last week to discuss the big profits he made by foreseeing the collapse of the subprime mortgage market, has started to buy securities backed by residential mortgages.
Mr Paulson's move marks the latest example of a famously bearish investor shifting gears to profit from depressed prices in the global credit markets.
US residential mortgage securities fell in value last week after Hank Paulson, Treasury secret-ary, said that the federal government had decided against buying toxic assets as part of its $700bn (£466bn) troubled asset relief programme (Tarp).
John Paulson, who is not related to the Treasury secretary, has told his investors that he started buying troubled mortgage-backed securities at the end of last week, hoping to capitalise on price falls that followed the Treasury announcement.
Mr Paulson, who has $36bn under management, was scheduled to hold a dinner and wine-tasting at New York's Metropolitan Club last night so that he could brief his investors on his plans.
According to Alpha Magazine, Mr Paulson made $3.7bn in 2007, reflecting the success of his strategy - begun in 2006 - of betting on a collapse of the subprime mortgage market. At the end of the third quarter of this year, his funds were up 15-25 per cent. His funds also made profits in October, his investors say.
For several months Mr Paulson has been considering investing in distressed subprime mortgage securities, financial firms and debt used to back private equity deals.
He estimated there are $10,000bn in total in such assets.
On November 17, 2008, Philip Morris International Inc. (the “Company”) issued $1,250,000,000 aggregate principal amount of its 6.875% Notes due 2014 (the “Notes”). The Notes were issued pursuant to an Indenture (the “Indenture”), dated as of April 25, 2008, by and between the Company and HSBC Bank USA, National Association, as trustee (the “Trustee”).
In connection with the issuance of the Notes, on November 12, 2008, the Company entered into a Terms Agreement (the “Terms Agreement”) with Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. and Goldman, Sachs & Co., as representatives of the several underwriters named therein (the “Underwriters”), pursuant to which the Company agreed to issue and sell the Notes to the Underwriters. The provisions of an Underwriting Agreement, dated as of April 25, 2008 (the “Underwriting Agreement”), are incorporated by reference in the Terms Agreement.
The Company has filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission a Prospectus, dated April 25, 2008, and a Prospectus Supplement (the “Prospectus Supplement”), dated November 12, 2008 (Registration No. 333-150449), in connection with the public offering of the Notes.
The Notes are subject to certain customary covenants, including limitations on the Company’s ability, with significant exceptions, to incur debt secured by liens and engage in sale and leaseback transactions. The Company may redeem all, but not part, of the Notes upon the occurrence of specified tax events as described in the Prospectus Supplement.
Interest on the Notes is payable semiannually on March 17 and September 17, commencing March 17, 2009, to holders of record on the preceding March 2 or September 2, as the case may be. Interest on the Notes will be computed on the basis of a 360-day year consisting of twelve 30-day months. The Notes will mature on March 17, 2014.
The Notes will be the Company’s senior unsecured obligations and will rank equally in right of payment with all of the Company’s existing and future senior unsecured indebtedness.
For a complete description of the terms and conditions of the Underwriting Agreement, the Terms Agreement and the Notes, please refer to such agreements and the form of Notes, each of which is incorporated herein by reference and attached to this report as Exhibits 1.1, 1.2 and 4.1, respectively.
Yahoo (YHOO) will drop the axe on December 10, Kara Swisher says, smack in the middle of the holidays (earlier, Jerry said Thanksgiving).
The company is still reportedly planning to can about 1,500 Yahoos. A cut of that size would only roll the company's workforce back to Q2 levels, and, in our opinion, it would leave Yahoo in a position where it might have to make further cuts next year. This is not the way to set the company up for a clean, fresh start.
In better news, Yahoo and AOL are reportedly far apart on price in their merger negotiations: AOL's at $6 billion, Yahoo's at $3 billion. Given how little interest either side has in doing this deal, it would almost certainly be a disaster if they did it, so better to just let it go. (If Yahoo can get AOL for $3-$4 billion, however, it should take it).
The incoming administration must think about that possibility because the timing of boom and bust cycles seems to be shortening. The next bust could come five or six years from now -- or about in the middle of an Obama second term. Should that happen, Mr. Obama would be unable to blame Republicans for the mess and would be tagged as the second coming of Jimmy Charter.
To avoid such a fate, Mr. Obama needs to stop the next asset bubble from being inflated by imposing a commodity standard on the Fed. A commodity standard (such as a gold standard) imposes discipline on a central bank because it forces it to acquire commodity reserves in order to increase the money supply. Today the government can inflate asset bubbles without paying a cost for it because the currency isn't linked to the price of a commodity.
With a commodity standard in place, the government would also have price signals that would alert it to the formation of a bubble. Why? Because the price of the commodity would be continuously traded in spot and futures markets. Excessive easing by the Fed would be signaled by rising prices for the commodity. In recent years, Fed officials have claimed that they cannot know when an asset bubble is developing. With a commodity standard in place, it would be clear to anyone watching spot markets whether a bubble is forming. What's more, if Fed officials ignored price signals, outflows of commodity reserves would force them to act against the bubble.
The point is not to deflate asset bubbles, but to avoid them in the first place. Imposing a commodity standard is a practical response to the repeated failures of central banks to maintain sound money and financial stability. What would be impractical is to believe that the next time central banks will get it right on their own.
The Department of Justice announced today that it will require InBev N.V./S.A. to divest subsidiary Labatt USA, along with a license to brew, market, promote and sell Labatt brand beer for consumption in the United States, in order to proceed with InBev's $52 billion acquisition of Anheuser-Busch Companies Inc. The Department said that the transaction, as originally proposed, would likely have led to higher prices for beer in the Buffalo, Rochester and Syracuse, N.Y., metropolitan areas.
The Department's Antitrust Division filed a civil antitrust lawsuit today in U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., to block the proposed transaction. At the same time, the Department filed a proposed settlement that, if approved by the court, would resolve the lawsuit and the Department's competitive concerns.
According to the complaint, Anheuser-Busch's Budweiser brands, including Budweiser and Bud Light, and InBev's Labatt brands, including Labatt Blue and Labatt Blue Light, are the two biggest selling beer brand families in Buffalo, Rochester and Syracuse. The original transaction would have eliminated competition between Labatt USA and Anheuser-Busch and resulted in higher prices to beer drinkers in those metropolitan areas.
Under the terms of the proposed settlement, InBev must sell Labatt USA and grant a license to the acquirer to brew and sell Labatt brand beer for consumption throughout the United States. The Department's Antitrust Division must approve the purchaser of Labatt USA to ensure that the sale will restore the competition for beer sales in Buffalo, Rochester and Syracuse that existed before InBev purchased Anheuser-Busch.
"This divestiture will ensure that consumers will continue to benefit from the significant competition between the merging companies in upstate New York," said Deborah A. Garza, Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division.
In the large majority of markets in the United States, InBev accounts for less than two percent of beer sales and engages in very little competition with Anheuser-Busch. In contrast, sales of InBev's Labatt beer brands in Buffalo, Rochester and Syracuse account for a significant portion of beer sales. The Department concluded that in those markets, the elimination of the competition between InBev and Anheuser-Busch would have resulted in higher prices for consumers. The proposed settlement will allow the purchaser of Labatt USA to sell the Labatt brands throughout the United States.
Bond insurer Assured Guaranty Ltd.(AGO) on Friday struck a $722 million deal to acquire rival Financial Securities Assurance Holdings from French-Belgian lender Dexia.
Dexia, which has struggled amid the credit crunch, will receive $361 million and 44.6 million shares in stock, giving the company a 25% stake in Assured Guaranty.
While Assured Guaranty will assume $730 million of FSA debt, the insurer won't get the toxic assets contained in FSA's asset-management business. Those will be guaranteed by the French and Belgian governments and wind down.
Assured Guaranty and FSA have remained the only AAA-rated U.S. bond insurers, as others around them have suffered amid the slumping value of structured investments such as collateralized debt obligations.
The purchase is subject, among other things, to the three major U.S. credit raters saying the takeover won't hurt either company's financial strength ratings. Moody's Investors Service and Fitch Ratings have been reviewing FSA for possible downgrade.
Assured Guaranty will sell stock to raise capital for the cash portion of the deal and has a back-up financing commitment from distressed-asset investor WL Ross & Co., which would purchase newly issued shares. The company has about 91 million shares outstanding.
Assured Guaranty has been able to thrive in recent months as rivals suffered amid reduced credit ratings. It has become a big player in municipal-debt insurance, with its market share climbing to 44% of insured activity in the direct new-issue U.S. public finance market last month. That compares with 1.1% a year earlier, according to Thomson Reuters.
The board of Citigroup Inc (C). is growing increasingly dissatisfied with the financial giant's performance, and some directors are considering replacing Sir Win Bischoff as chairman, according to people familiar with the matter.
One leading candidate is Richard Parsons, Time Warner Inc.'s (TWX) chairman and a member of Citigroup's board. Mr. Parsons ran a New York thrift in the early 1990s and is one of the few Citigroup directors with experience in financial services. He also is part of President-elect Barack Obama's transition economic-advisory board.
Richard Parsons had spent a career in banking and was CEO of Dime Savings Bank of New York when he was named president of Time Warner in 1994, a move that caught many people by surprise. Mr. Parsons is credited with stabilizing the company, mediating between fractious divisions and reorganizing top management. In 2003, the board unanimously elected him to the additional post of chairman, which he continued to hold after stepping down as CEO in 2007. Mr. Parsons said in May he was likely to resign as chairman in 2009.
The possible replacement of Sir Win comes as the New York company's board is adopting an increasingly assertive stance toward overseeing Chief Executive Officer Vikram Pandit and his tightknit team of executives. Those executives took power last December after Citigroup's previous CEO, Charles Prince, stepped down amid mounting losses. Some directors have grown concerned that Sir Win, who is based in London, hasn't been exercising adequate oversight.
It isn't clear how many of Citigroup's directors are agitating for the change, and it's possible that the board will opt to stick with its current chairman.
"I'm not sure it will happen, but it seems likely" that Sir Win will be replaced, said one person familiar with the situation.
Sir Win, who has dual British and German citizenship, was traveling in the Middle East on Wednesday and wasn't immediately available to comment.
Sir Win Bischoff was head of Citigroup's European operations and little known outside the company when he was appointed interim CEO in November 2007. To the surprise of many who expected his leadership to be temporary, Sir Win was named chairman a month later when Vikram S. Pandit became CEO. Sir Win had no hands-on capital-markets trading experience, but had cleaned up after huge losses before, advising the British government on the rescue of Barings PLC after trading losses in 1995.
"Any report that the board is searching for a new chairman is false," a Citigroup spokeswoman said Wednesday evening.